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Abstract
Sequential allocation is a simple allocation mechanism in which agents are given
pre-specified turns and each agents gets the most preferred item that is still
available. It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof.
Bouveret and Lang (2014) presented a polynomial-time algorithm to com-
pute a best response of an agent with respect to additively separable utilities
and claimed that (1) their algorithm correctly finds a best response, and (2) each
best response results in the same allocation for the manipulator. We show that
both claims are false via an example. We then show that in fact the problem
of computing a best response is NP-complete. On the other hand, the insights
and results of Bouveret and Lang (2014) for the case of two agents still hold.
1. Introduction
A simple but popular mechanism to allocate indivisible items is sequential
allocation [2, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 14]. In sequential allocation, a sequence specifies the
turns of the agents. For example, for sequence 1212, agents 1 and 2 alternate
with agent 1 taking the first turn. Agent take turns according to the sequence
and are given the the most preferred item that has not yet been allocated.
Sequential allocation is an ordinal mechanism since the outcome only depends
on the ordinal preferences of agents over items. Nevertheless, it is a standard
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assumption in the literature that agents have underlying additive utilities for
the items.
It has long been known that sequential allocation is not strategyproof in
particular when agents do not have consecutive turns. This motivates the nat-
ural problem of computing best responses (also referred to as manipulations).
Kohler and Chandrasekaran [12] presented a polynomial-time algorithm to com-
pute the optimal manipulation of an agent when there are two agents and the
sequence is alternating (121212..). Bouveret and Lang [3] initiated further work
on manipulation of sequential allocation. They showed that it can be checked
in polynomial time whether an agent can be allocated a certain subset of items.
Since there can be exponential number of subsets, the result does not show that
finding the optimal response is polynomial-time solvable as well.
Results. We on focus on computing best responses (or manipulations) under se-
quential allocation. Recently, Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] presented a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute a best response of an agent and claimed that (1)
their algorithm correctly finds an optimal response and (2) each best response
results in the same allocation for the manipulator. The result has been cited
in a number of works [see e.g., 1, 10, 13, 8]. We first show that both claims
are false by the help of an example. We then show that in fact the problem
of computing a best response is NP-complete. The result has some interesting
consequences since many allocation rules are based on sequential allocation and
for all such rules, there cannot be a general polynomial-time to manipulate the
mechanism unless P=NP. Since manipulation by even one agent is NP-hard,
the NP-hardness also implies a number of NP-hardness results by Bouveret and
Lang [4, 5] on coalitional manipulation.
2. Preliminaries
We consider the setting in which we have N = {1, . . . , n} a set of agents,
O = {o1, . . . , om} a set of items, and the preference profile ≻= (≻1, . . . ,≻n)
specifies for each agent i his complete, strict, and transitive preference ≻i over
O.
Each agent may additionally express a cardinal utility function ui consistent
with ≻i: ui(o) > ui(o
′) iff o ≻i o
′. We will assume that each item is positively
valued, i.e, ui(o) > 0 for all i ∈ N and o ∈ O. The set of all utility functions
consistent with ≻i is denoted by U (≻i). We will denote by U (≻) the set of all
utility profiles u = (u1, . . . , un) such that ui ∈ U (≻i) for each i ∈ N . When
we consider agents’ valuations according to their cardinal utilities, then we will
assume additivity, that is ui(O
′) =
∑
o∈O′ ui(o) for each i ∈ N and O
′ ⊆ O.
At times, we will present an assignment in matrix form. An assignment is
an n × m matrix [p(i)(oj)]1≤i≤n,1≤j≤m such that for all i ∈ N , and oj ∈ O,
p(i)(hj) ∈ {0, 1}; and for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
∑
i∈N p(i)(oj) = 1. An agent i
gets item oj if and only if p(i)(oj) = 1. Each row p(i) = (p(i)(h1), . . . , p(i)(om))
represents the allocation of agent i.
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We say that utilities are lexicographic if for each agent i ∈ N , ui(o) >∑
o′≺io
ui(o
′). By S ≻i T , we will mean ui(S) ≥ ui(T ).
Example 1. Consider the setting in which N = {1, 2}, O = {o1, o2, o3, o4}, the
preferences of agents are
1 : o1, o2, o3, o4
2 : o1, o3, o2, o4
Then for the policy 1221, agent 1 gets {o1, o4} while 2 gets {o2, o3}. The assign-
ment resulting from sequential allocation (SA) can be represented as follows.
SA(≻1,≻2) =
(
1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0
)
.
3. Computing a Best Response: Case of Three or More Agents
In the next example, we highlight that for n ≥ 3, the best response algorithm
of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] does not work and that an optimal manipulation
may not result in a unique allocation.
Example 2. Observe the following preference profile.
1 : a, b, c, d
2 : c, d, a, b
3 : a, b, c, d
Let the sequence be 1231. Now according to the best response algorithm of
Bouveret and Lang [4], the best response is one in which agent 1 gets {a, d}
which can even be achieved by the truthful report. The reason the algorithm
of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5] returns the truthful report as the best response is
because it first construct allocation {a} and checks that it is achievable; then it
checks whether {a, b} is achievable and finds that it is not achievable; then it
checks whether {a, c} is achievable and finds that it is not achievable, and finally
the algorithm terminates when it is found that {a, d} is achievable for agent 1
via the truthful report.
Let us assume that agent 1 misreports so that the reported preference profile
is as follows:
1′ : c, b, a, d
2 : c, d, a, b
3 : a, b, c, d
Under the misreport, agent 1 gets {b, c}. Agent 1 cannot get {a, b} or {a, c}
which are not achievable. But he can get {a, d} or {b, c} depending on what he
reports. Now which one is better clearly depends on the actual utilities and not
just on the ordinal preferences. For example if the utilities are 3.1, 3, 2 and
3
1 then {b, c} is preferred over {a, d} and hence {a, d} is not the best possible
achievable allocation for agent 1 which means that
Moreover, if the utilities are 4, 3, 2, 1, then agent 1 is completely indifferent
between the allocations {a, d} and {b, c}. This proves that there may be best
responses that do not yield a unique allocation for the manipulator when the
number of non-manipulators is 2 or more (i.e., when the total number of agents
is 3 or more).
The example above simply shows that algorithm of Bouveret and Lang [4, 5]
does not necessarily compute a best response that gives maximum utility to
the agent. It does not settle the complexity of computing a best response.
Next, we show that the problem is NP-hard. The reduction involves a similar
high-level idea as that of the result by Aziz et al. [1] that manipulating the
probabilistic serial (PS) mechanism is NP-hard. However, the reduction requires
new gadgets. Also note that the NP-hardness result for the PS mechanism does
not directly imply a similar result for sequential allocation. Similarly, NP-
hardness to manipulate sequential allocation does not imply NP-hardness to
manipulate the PS mechanism.
Theorem 1. Computing a best response for the sequential allocation mechanism
is NP-complete.
Proof. To show hardness, we prove that the following problem (Best Re-
sponse) is NP-complete: given an assignment setting and a utility function
u : O → N specifying the utility of each item for the manipulator (agent 1)
and a target utility T , can the manipulator specify preferences such that the
utility for his allocation under the sequential allocation rule is at least T ? The
problem Best Response is clearly in NP. The outcome with respect to the
reported preference can be computed by simulating sequential allocation. The
utility achieved by the agent can be computed by adding the utility of the items
allocated to the agent.
We reduce from a restricted NP-complete version of 3SAT where each
literal appears exactly twice in the formula. The problem remains NP-
complete [Lemma 1, 9]. Given such a 3SAT instance F = (X,C) where
X = {x1, . . . , x|X|} is the set of variables and C the set of clauses, we build
an instance of Best Response where the manipulator can obtain utility ≥ T
if and only if the formula is satisfiable. We will denote by L the set of literals.
The set of agents is composed of
• Agent 1 the manipulator/responder; and
• agents a1xi and a
2
xi
for each literal xi.
To summarize, the agent set is:
N = {1} ∪ {a1xi , a
2
xi
: xi ∈ L}.
The set of items O is as follows:
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• Clause items o1c , o
2
c , o
3
c for each clause c;
• Choice items o1xi , o
2
xi
for each literal xi;
• Consistency items h1xi , h
2
xi
, h3xi for each literal xi;
• Dummy items d11xi , d
12
xi
, d21xi , d
22
xi
for each literal xi.
To summarize, the item set is:
O = {o1c , o
2
c , o
3
c : c ∈ C} ∪ {o
1
xi
, o2xi , h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
3
xi
, d11xi , d
12
xi
, d21xi , d
22
xi
: xi ∈ L}
We view the sequential allocation process as follows. The preferences are
built in a way so that the agents go through |X | choice rounds corresponding to
variables x1, . . . , x|X| and then |C| clause rounds corresponding to c1, . . . , c|C|
with one final round called the collection round in wich
High-level Idea. The items that agent 1 potentially gets in each round have
considerably more utility than items he is supposed to get in latter rounds.
If agent 1 does not get the items systematically, they will be taken by other
agents and and then agent 1 will not be able to make up for the loss of not
getting those items first. This ensures that in each round agent 1 makes a
choice between the items corresponding to the positive and negative literals
of a variable. There is negligible difference between the utility of the items
corresponding to the literal and its negation (for example o1x and o
1
¬x) so what
is important is that agent chooses one of the items corresponding to the literals.
If agent 1 makes the correct choices, then it will ensure that it gets a most
preferred items corresponding to each of the clause items. We want to show
that there is a satisfiable assignment if and only if agent 1 gets utility T . This is
only possible if agent 1 sets the choice variables in a consistent way and manages
to get the most preferred clause item for each clause which is only possible if each
clause is set to be true which in turn is only possible if the agents corresponding
to the negation of the literal in the clause do not get the clause items. The way
the reduction works is also illustrated in Example 3 right after the proof.
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi 1 a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi 1 a
1
xi
a2xi 1
Item picked o1¬xi o
1
xi
d21xi d
11
¬xi d
21
¬xi o
2
¬xi d
11
xi
o2xi h
1
¬xi h
2
¬xi d
12
xi
d22xi h
3
¬xi d
12
¬xi d
22
¬xi h
1
xi
Table 1: Choice round for variable xi in which agent 1 makes consistent choice o1¬xi and o
2
¬xi
so that variable xi is set to true. Agents a1¬xi and a
2
¬xi
next focus on items h2xi and h
3
xi
before turning their attention to the clause items. On the other hand, a1xi and a
2
xi
already
want to get clause items. In this way the literal that is set false, their corresponding agents
are quicker to get their clause items.
Choice Round. This choice round is composed of two back to back sub rounds
in which agent 1 has to choose a literal corresponding to a variable and then do
this again.
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Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi 1 a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi 1 a
1
xi
a2xi 1
Item picked o1xi d
11
xi
d21xi o
1
¬xi d
21
¬xi o
2
xi
d12xi d
22
xi
d11¬xi o
2
¬xi h
1
xi
h2xi h
1
¬xi h
2
¬xi h
3
¬xi h
3
xi
Table 2: Choice round for variable xi in which agent 1 makes consistent choice o
1
xi
and o2xi so
that variable xi is set to false. Agents a
1
xi
and a2xi next focus on items d
12
¬xi
and d22
¬xi
before
turning their attention to the clause items. On the other hand, a1
¬xi
and a2
¬xi
already want
to get clause items. In this way the literal that is set false, their corresponding agents are
quicker to get their clause items.
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi 1 a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi 1 a
1
xi
a2xi 1
Item picked o1xi d
11
xi
d21xi o
1
¬xi d
21
¬xi o
2
¬xi d
12
xi
o2x1 d
11
¬x1 h
1
¬xi h
1
xi
d22xi h
2
¬xi h
2
¬xi h
3
¬xi h
2
xi
Table 3: Choice round for variable xi in which agent 1 makes inconsistent choice o
1
xi
and
o
2
¬xi
. As a result of making an inconsistent choice, agent 1 does not get h1
¬xi
or h1xi .
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi 1 a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi a
1
xi
a2xi a
1
¬xi a
2
¬xi 1 a
1
xi
a2xi 1
Item picked o1¬xi o
1
xi
d21xi d
11
¬xi d
21
¬xi o
2
xi
d11xi d
22
xi
h1¬xi o
2
¬xi d
12
xi
h1xi h
2
¬xi d
12
¬xi d
22
¬xi h
2
xi
Table 4: Choice round for variable xi in which agent 1 makes inconsistent choice o
1
¬xi
and
o
2
xi
Let us consider the truth assignment corresponding to the choices agent 1
makes. A literal xi is considered to be true iff agent 1 picks o
1
¬xi and o
2
¬xi in
choice round i.
The sequence in choice round i for variable xi is as follows
1, a1¬xi, a
2
¬xi , a
1
xi
, a2xi , 1, a
1
¬xi, a
2
¬xi, a
1
xi
, a2xi , a
1
¬xi , a
2
¬xi, 1, a
1
xi
, a2xi , 1
The preferences relevant for the choice round are as follows. Each literal
agent likes items corresponding to the negation of the literal.
For each variable xi, agent 1 has the following preferences
1 : o1xi , o
1
¬xi , o
2
xi
, o2¬xi , h
1
¬xi, h
2
¬xi , h
3
¬xi , h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
3
xi
,
For each variable xi, the preferences of the related agents are as follows:
a1¬xi : o
1
xi
, d11xi , d
12
xi
, o2xi , h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
3
xi
a2¬xi : d
21
xi
, o1xi , o
2
xi
, d22xi , h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
3
xi
a1xi : o
1
¬xi , d
11
¬xi , h
1
¬xi , o
2
¬xi , h
2
¬xi, h
3
¬xi , d
12
¬xi
a2xi : d
21
¬xi , o
1
¬xi , o
2
¬xi , h
1
¬xi , h
2
¬xi, h
3
¬xi , d
22
¬xi
Any items that are not in the preference list of an agent are considered
to be far down in the preference list. Note the difference in the preferences
of the negative versus the positive literals: the positive literal agents have a
dummy item as the least preferred item relevant to the picking in the choice
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round whereas the negative literal agents have the consistency items as the
least preferred items relevant to the picking in the choice round.
The preferences agents in the choice round are made in such a way to that
agent 1 is compelled to make consistent choice so that it not only gets literal
items corresponding to its choice but also one if its most two preferred consis-
tency items. If agent makes a consistent choice o1xi and o
2
xi
, or ¬o1xi and ¬o
2
xi
,
then 1 gets either {h1xi, h
3
¬xi} or {h
1
¬xi, h
3
xi
} for that round. This scenario is
captured in Table 1 and Table 2. If agent 1 makes an inconsistent choice o1xi
and ¬o2xi , or ¬o
1
xi
and o2xi , then 1 gets h
2
xi
and h2¬xi. This scenario is captured
in Table 3 and Table 4.
Clause round. The sequence in clause round corresponding to clause c = (xi ∨
¬xj ∨ ¬xk) is as follows.
a¬xi , axj , axk ,−−−, 1
For each literal x in the clause c, there is an agent a1¬x or a
2
¬x that features in
the round. Agent a1¬x features if c is the first clause in which literal x is present.
Agent a2¬x features if c is the second clause in which literal x is present. Recall
that each literal occurs in exactly two clauses in the formula. After all the clause
rounds are finished, agent 1 gets |C| turns to get a chance to get clause items
in case they are available.
For agent 1, the relevant preferences in the clause round are:
1 : o1c
For a variable x, if x is a literal in the clause, the relevant preferences in this
round are:
a1¬x : h
2
x, h
3
x, o
3
c , o
2
c , o
1
c such that x ∈ cj
a2¬x : h
2
x, h
3
x, o
3
c′ , o
2
c′ , o
1
c′ such that x ∈ c
′ 6= c
For a variable x, if ¬x is a literal in the clause, the relevant preferences in
this round are:
a1x : d
12
¬x, o
3
c , o
2
c , o
1
c such that ¬x ∈ cj
a2x : d
22
¬x, o
3
c′ , o
2
c′ , o
1
c′ such that ¬x ∈ c
′ 6= c
Please note that the items h2x, h
3
x are the consistency items that featured
in relevant items in the choice round corresponding to variable x and d12¬x and
d22¬x are the dummy items that featured in relevant items in the choice round
corresponding to variable x. If agent 1 has made a consistent choice in the
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choice round corresponding to variable x and set x to “true”, then a1xi and a
2
xi
already want to get clause items in their respective clause rounds. If agent 1 has
made a consistent choice in the choice round corresponding to variable x and
set x to “false”, then a1¬xi and a
2
¬xi already want to get clause items in their
respective clause rounds.
In the clause round, any literal that is not satisfied, the agent corresponding
to literal gets a clause item. So for example if literal x is false, then a1¬x gets a
clause item for the first clause in which x is present. a2x gets a clause item for
the second clause in which x is present. Therefore, if all the literals of a clause
c are false, then agent 1 does not get o1c .
If literal x is satisfied, the agent a¬x corresponding to it gets a dummy or
consistency item in that round instead of a clause item. This means that if all
the literals of a clause are not satisfied, then all three clause items of a clause
are gone, and agent 1 does not get a clause item. He is only interested in one of
the clause items o1c . The other clause items are far down in his preference list
so he would rather get all the top clause item o1c for each clause c rather than
o2c and o
3
c .
Let us assume that for clause c = (xi ∨ ¬xj ∨ ¬xk), variables xi, xj and xk
are set to true i.e., agent 1 got choice items corresponding to the ¬xi, ¬xj and
¬xk. This means that in the clause round, a
1
xj
and a1xk are ready to take their
clause items o3c and o
2
c but a
1
¬xi wants to get one of the unallocated consistency
items before he is interested in consistency items o3c , o
2
c , o
1
c . This is helpful for
agent 1 because he can get o1c . Since each literal occurs exactly twice in the
formula, note that as long as 1 makes a consistent choice, there will be another
clause c′ in which literal x is present and if x is set to true, then a2¬x will get
h3xi and hence 1 will be able to get oc′ . Note that after the clause rounds all the
consistency items are already consumed so the agent 1 can hope to get all the
top clause items if they were not already taken in the clause rounds.
Stage 1 2 3 after clause rounds
Agent a1¬xi a
1
xj
a1xk 1
Item picked h2xi o
3
c o
2
c o
1
c
Table 5: Clause round corresponding to clause c = (xi ∨ ¬xj ∨ ¬xk)
Collection round. The sequence in the collection round
1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
|C|
The relevant preferences are:
1 : oc1 , . . . , oc|C|
The idea is that if agent 1 make choices that sets all the clauses as true, then
agent 1 gets all the clause items. Note that if 1 makes a consistent choice for
the variables but does not pick up all the clause items in the collection round
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(because the formula is unsatisfiable), then 1 does not get all the clause items.
Since there are items less preferred by 1 than the o1cs such as o
2
c and o
3
cs, agent
1 is forced to pick a much less preferred item in the collection round.
Utility of Agent 1. The utility function u1 of agent 1 is specified as follows:
• There is negligible difference between u1(o
1
xi
) and u1(o
1
¬xi). The utility of
both is considerably more than u1(o
2
xi
) and u1(o
2
¬xi). There is negligible
difference between u1(o
2
xi
) and u1(o
2
¬xi).
• For any variable xi, agent 1’s preferences over the consistency items are
as follows:
1 : h1¬xi, h
2
¬xi , h
3
¬xi , h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
3
xi
The utility is set as follows: u1(h
2
xi
) + u1(h
2
¬xi) < u1(h
1
¬xi) + u1(h
3
xi
) =
u1(h
1
xi
) + u1(h
3
¬xi).
• All items that agent 1 is considering getting in a round (choice or clause)
are considerably more preferred than the corresponding items in the latter
rounds.
• The utilities are set in a way so that as long as agent 1 gets two items
corresponding to a variable, at least one top choice consistency items in
each round and his target clause item in each clause round, agent 1 gets
utility at least T .
Based on construction of the choice and clause rounds, we are in a position
to prove a series of claims.
Claim 1. If agent 1 does not make a consistent choice of the variable items,
then it does not get utility T .
Proof. If 1 does not make a choice in each choice round, his most preferred
items corresponding to the literals are taken by the agents corresponding to the
literal. If 1 makes a choice in each choice round but does not make a consistent
choice, then he gets {h2¬x, h
2
x} which has much less utility than {h
1
¬x, h
3
x} or
{h1x, h
3
¬x} which means he cannot get total utility T .
Claim 2. If agent 1 makes consistent choices but the assignment is not satis-
fying, then agent 1 does not get utility T .
Proof. If some clause c is set false, then agent 1 is not able to o1c because the
literal agents in the clause round corresponding to c take all the items o3c , o
2
c , o
1
c .
This means that agent 1 does not get utility T .
Claim 3. If there exists a satisfying assignment, then agent 1 can get utility T .
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Proof. If there exists a satisfying assignment, then consider the preference report
of agent 1 in which in each choice round, he picks o1xi and o
2
xi
if the xi is set to
be false. By doing this he gets to pick a top consistency item in that round as
well. Since all the clauses are satisfied, in each clause round, agent 1 is able to
gets his clause item o1c . The utilities are set in a way so that as long as agent
1 gets two items corresponding to the same literal and hence at least one top
choice consistency items in each round and his target clause item in each clause
round, agent 1 gets utility at least T .
The claims show that agent 1 gets utility at least T if and only if there is a
satisfying truth assignment.
Example 3. We illustrate the reduction in the proof of Theorem 1. For the
following SAT formula, we illustrate how we build an allocation setting with the
agent set, item set, preferences of agents and the picking sequence.
(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c1
(¬x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ ¬x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c2
(x1 ∨ ¬x2 ∨ x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c3
(¬x1 ∨ x2 ∨ ¬x3)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c4
Set of agents is N = {1} ∪ {a1xi , a
2
xi
, a1¬xi , a
2
¬xi : i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}.
Set of items is O = {o1xi , o
2
xi
, o1¬xi , o
2
¬xi, h
1
xi
, h2xi , h
1
¬xi , h
2
¬xi, d
11
xi
, d12xi , d
21
xi
, d22xi :
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}}
1 : o1x1 , o
1
¬x1 , o
2
x1
, o2¬x1 , h
1
¬x1 , h
2
¬x1 , h
3
¬x1 , h
1
x1
, h2x1 , h
3
x1
,
o1x2 , o
1
¬x2 , o
2
x2
, o2¬x2 , h
1
¬x2 , h
2
¬x2 , h
3
¬x2 , h
1
x2
, h2x2 , h
3
x2
o1x3 , o
1
¬x3 , o
2
x3
, o2¬x3 , h
1
¬x3 , h
2
¬x3 , h
3
¬x3 , h
1
x3
, h2x3 , h
3
x3
o1c1 , o
1
c2
, o1c3 , o
1
c4
a1¬x1 : o
1
x1
, d11x1 , d
12
x1
, o2x1 , h
1
x1
, h2x1 , h
3
x1
, o3c1 , o
2
c1
, o1c1
a2¬x1 : d
21
x1
, o1x1 , o
2
x1
, d22xi , h
1
x1
, h2x1 , h
3
x1
, o3c3 , o
2
c3
, o1c3
a1¬x2 : o
1
x2
, d11x2 , d
12
x2
, o2x2 , h
1
x2
, h2x2 , h
3
x2
, o3c1 , o
2
c1
, o1c1
a2¬x2 : d
21
x2
, o1x2 , o
2
x2
, d22xi , h
1
x2
, h2x2 , h
3
x2
, o3c4 , o
2
c4
, o1c4
a1¬x3 : o
1
x3
, d11x3 , d
12
x3
, o2x3 , h
1
x3
, h2x3 , h
3
x3
, o3c1 , o
2
c1
, o1c1
a2¬x3 : d
21
x3
, o1x3 , o
2
x3
, d22xi , h
1
x3
, h2x3 , h
3
x3
, o3c3 , o
2
c3
, o1c3
a1x1 : o
1
¬x1 , d
11
¬x1 , h
1
¬x1, o
2
¬x1 , h
2
¬x1, h
3
¬x1 , d
12
¬x1o
3
c2
, o2c2 , o
1
c2
a2x1 : d
21
¬x1 , o
1
¬x1 , o
2
¬x1 , h
1
¬x1 , h
2
¬x1, h
3
¬x1 , d
22
¬x1 , o
3
c4
, o2c4 , o
1
c4
a1x2 : o
1
¬x2 , d
11
¬x2 , h
1
¬x2, o
2
¬x2 , h
2
¬x2, h
3
¬x2 , d
12
¬x2 , o
3
c2
, o2c2 , o
1
c2
a2x2 : d
21
¬x2 , o
1
¬x2 , o
2
¬x2 , h
1
¬x2 , h
2
¬x2, h
3
¬x2 , d
22
¬x2 , o
3
c3
, o2c3 , o
1
c3
a1x3 : o
1
¬x3 , d
11
¬x3 , h
1
¬x3, o
2
¬x3 , h
2
¬x3, h
3
¬x3 , d
12
¬x3 , o
3
c2
, o2c2 , o
1
c2
a2x3 : d
21
¬x3 , o
1
¬x3 , o
2
¬x3 , h
1
¬x3 , h
2
¬x3, h
3
¬x3 , d
22
¬x3 , o
3
c4
, o2c4 , o
1
c4
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The picking sequence is as follows
choice round 1 1, a1¬x1, a
2
¬x1, a
1
x1
, a2x1 , 1, a
1
¬x1 , a
2
¬x1, a
1
¬x1 , a
2
¬x1 , a
1
¬x1, a
2
¬x1 , 1, a
1
x1
, a2x1 , 1
choice round 2 1, a1¬x2, a
2
¬x2, a
1
x2
, a2x2 , 1, a
1
¬x2 , a
2
¬x2, a
1
¬x2 , a
2
¬x2 , a
1
¬x2, a
2
¬x2 , 1, a
1
x2
, a2x2 , 1
choice round 3 1, a1¬x3, a
2
¬x3, a
1
x3
, a2x3 , 1, a
1
¬x3 , a
2
¬x3, a
1
¬x3 , a
2
¬x3 , a
1
¬x3, a
2
¬x3 , 1, a
1
x3
, a2x3 , 1
clause round 1 a1¬x1, a
1
¬x2 , a
1
¬x3
choice round 2 a1x1 , a
1
x2
, a1x3
choice round 3 a2¬x1, a
2
x2
, a2¬x3
choice round 4 a2x1 , a
2
¬x2, a
2
x3
collection round 1, 1, 1, 1
The formula is satisfiable if x1 is true, x2 is false and x3 is false. Let us
show how the allocation looks like when agent 1 picks items according to the
truth assignment.
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬x1 a
2
¬x1 a
1
x1
a2x1 1 a
1
¬x1 a
2
¬x1 a
1
x1
a2x1 a
1
¬x1 a
2
¬x1 1 a
1
x1
a2x1 1
Item picked o1¬x1 o
1
x1
d21x1 d
11
¬x1 d
21
¬x1 o
2
¬x1 d
11
x1
o2x1 h
1
¬x1 h
2
¬x1 d
12
x1
d22x1 h
3
¬x1 d
12
¬x1 d
22
¬x1 h
1
x1
Table 6: Choice round 1 for variable x1 in which agent 1 makes consistent choice o1¬x1 and
o
2
¬x1
so that variable x1 is set to true.
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬x2 a
2
¬x2 a
1
x2
a2x2 1 a
1
¬x2 a
2
¬x2 a
1
x2
a2x2 a
1
¬x2 a
2
¬x2 1 a
1
x2
a2x2 1
Item picked o1x2 d
11
x2
d21x2 o
1
¬x2 d
21
¬x2 o
2
x2
d12x2 d
22
x2
d11¬x2 o
2
¬x2 h
1
x2
h2x2 h
1
¬x2 h
2
¬x2 h
3
¬x2 h
3
x2
Table 7: Choice round 2 for variable x2 in which agent 1 makes consistent choice o1x2 and o
2
x2
so that variable x2 is set to false.
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Agent 1 a1¬x3 a
2
¬x3 a
1
x3
a2x3 1 a
1
¬x3 a
2
¬x3 a
1
x3
a2x3 a
1
¬x3 a
2
¬x3 1 a
1
x3
a2x3 1
Item picked o1x3 d
11
x3
d21x3 o
1
¬x3 d
21
¬x3 o
2
x3
d12x3 d
22
x3
d11¬x3 o
2
¬x3 h
1
x3
h2x3 h
1
¬x3 h
2
¬x3 h
3
¬x3 h
3
x3
Table 8: Choice round 3 for variable x3 in which agent 1 makes consistent choice o1x3 and o
2
x3
so that variable x3 is set to false.
Stage 1 2 3
Agent a1¬x1 a
1
¬x2 a
1
¬x3
Item picked h2x1 o
3
c1
o3c1
Table 9: Clause round 1
4. Computing a Best Response: Case of Two Agents
The insights and results of Bouveret and Lang [5] in their Section 3.1 and
3.2 still hold for n = 2. For the sake of completeness, we outline the main
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Stage 1 2 3
Agent a1x1 a
1
x2
a1x3
Item picked o3c2 d
12
¬x2 d
12
¬x3
Table 10: Clause round 2
Stage 1 2 3
Agent a2¬x1 a
2
x2
a2¬x3
Item picked h3x1 d
22
¬x2 o
2
c3
Table 11: Clause round 3
Stage 1 2 3
Agent a2x1 a
2
¬x2 a
2
x3
Item picked o2c4 o
2
c4
d22¬x3
Table 12: Clause round 4
Stage 1 2 3 4
Agent 1 1 1 1
Item picked o1c1 o
1
c2
o1c3 o
1
c4
Table 13: Collection round
arguments. We can ascertain that for n = 2, not only is there is a linear-time
algorithm to compute a best response but each best response results in the
same allocation irrespective of the cardinal utilities consistent with the ordinal
preferences.
We present a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (From Proposition 7 by Bouveret and Lang [3]). Let the set of items
S = {a1, . . . , am1} be such that a1 ≻2 a2 · · · ≻2 am1 . If S is achievable by 1 for
some preference report, then agent 1 can achieve S by reporting a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1
· · ·am1 ≻1 {all other items}.
Proof. Consider any report ≻′
1
such that the result of (≻′
1
,≻2 is that agent 1
gets S. Then changing ≻′1 to ≻
′′
1 in which items in O \ S are moved to items
after S does not change the outcome. At each stage when agent i ∈ {1, 2} picks,
the most preferred available item of i remains the same.
We now show that if agent 1 can achieve S, he can do so by reporting
a1 ≻1 a2 · · · am1 ≻1 {all other items}. Assume that agent 1 does not get S by
report a1 ≻1 a2 · · · am1 · · · ≻1 {all other items}. We show that agent 1 cannot
get S by any other report. Let us consider the earliest stage in which agent 2
gets an item from S. Let the item be ai in stage ℓ. This means that by stage
ℓ agent 2 did not any items from {a1, . . . , ai−1} which agent 1 got. Note that
by stage ℓ, agent 1 gets i − 1 picks and agent 2 gets ℓ − (i − 1) = ℓ = i + 1
picks. Note that {a : a ≻2 ai} is the union of {a1, . . . , ai−1} and the items in
O \ S that agent 2 got before stage ℓ. The most preferred ℓ items of agent 2
include i items from S and ℓ− 1− (i− 1) = ℓ− i other items. Since agent 2 has
ℓ− i+ 1 picks, he will be able to get one item from {a1, . . . , ai} irrespective of
what agent 1 reports because by stage ℓ, agent 1 has only i− 1 picks.
Lemma 2 (From Proposition 7 by Bouveret and Lang [3]). Let the set of
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items S = {a1, . . . , am1} be such that a1 ≻2 a2 · · · ≻2 am1 . Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(i) S is achievable.
(ii) agent 1 can achieve S by reporting a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1 · · ·am1 · · · ≻1
{all other items}.
(iii) when agent 1 reports a1 ≻1 a2 ≻1 · · ·am1 · · · ≻1 {all other items}, for
each picking stage ℓ in which agent 1 picks his i-th, all the ℓ − i items
allocated to 2 by stage ℓ more preferred than ai.
Proof. (ii) trivially implies (i). Lemma 1 shows that (ii) implies (i).
We prove that (iii) implies (ii) Let us assume that for each picking stage ℓ
in which agent 1 picks his i-th, all the ℓ− i items allocated to 2 by stage ℓ more
preferred than ai. Then agent 2 is always busy getting more preferred items
and agent 1 get ai in his i-th pick.
We prove that (ii) implies (iii). Now assume that in some picking stage ℓ in
which agent 1 picks his i-th item (ai), not all the ℓ − i items allocated to 2 by
stage ℓ are more preferred than ai. But this means that 2 would have picked ai
already by stage ℓ.
Lemma 3 (Proposition 9 of Bouveret and Lang [3]). For two agents, lexico-
graphic best response is polynomial-time computable.
Proof. Let us assume that the preferences of the manipulator are o1, o2, . . . , om.
We set the target set S to empty and O′ to O. Take the most preferred item
o ∈ O′ and check whether S ∪ {o} is achievable by 1. If yes, we append o to
S. In either case we delete o from O′. We continue in this fashion until O′ is
empty. For n = 2, it can be easily checked whether a given subset S of items
is achievable by letting agent 1 express the items in S in the same order of
preferences as agent 2’s preferences over S. This follows from Lemma 1.
Next, we see that for n = 2, the outcome of any best response is the same for
the manipulator. The argument of Bouveret and Lang [5] works as it is directly
for the case of two agents.
Lemma 4 (Lemma 1 of Bouveret and Lang [5]). Let A and B be achievable
by agent 1. Let a = max≻1((A \ B) ∪ (B \ A)) and assume that a ∈ A. Let
b = max≻1(B \A). Then B ∪ {a} \ {b} is achievable for agent 1.
Based on the lemmas above, the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem 2 (Bouveret and Lang [4, 5]). For n = 2, there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm to compute a best response. Furthermore the allocation of re-
sponding agent as a result of the best response is unique.
Proof. From Lemma 4, we know that in order to compute a best response for
a given utility function consistent with the ordinal preferences, it is sufficient
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to compute the best response for any utility function consistent with the ordi-
nal preferences. We know from Lemma 3 that there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm to compute the best response for lexicographic utilities.
Corollary 1. For n = 2, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to verify a
pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If there exists a polynomial-time algorithm to compute a best response,
it can be used to compute the best response of each agent. A profile is in pure
Nash equilibrium if and only if the best response of each agent yields at most
the same utility as the preference reported in the given preference profile.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we showed that computing a best response under sequential
allocation to maximize additive utility is NP-hard. The result is surprising
because previously it has been claimed in the literature (COMSOC 2014 and
ECAI 2014) that the problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm. Our NP-
hardness result does not involve a constant number of agents. It remains an
interesting open problem whether manipulating sequential allocation is NP-hard
when the number of agents is three or some other constant.
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